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This study aims to approach the impact of firms’ age in regard to their financial 
information quality within a sample of 612.899 non-financial Portuguese and 
Spanish companies referring to the time period expanding from 2007 to 2012. The 
main focus is in contrasting startup firms (determined as those established after 
2007) and mature firms (determined as those established before 2007), in respect 
to differences as to their respective levels of discretionary accruals prevailing 
throughout their distributions. This is achieved through the estimation of the 
Dechow-Dichev Model, and, ultimately and subsequently, in their due 
information quality. Furthermore, two Versions of the Model are estimated, 
considering different forms of external financing (loans and liabilities). It appears 
that accruals-based earnings management does differ whether startup firms or 
mature firms are considered, with higher levels of discretionary accruals 
prevailing within startups, although mature firms ultimately seem to provide for 
lower levels of information quality, being these findings congruent with the 
notion that mature firms rely on a much larger pool of resources and are able to 
manage their accounts more effectively if they choose to do so. 
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In a speech delivered in 1998, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Arthur Levitt, warned that a “numbers game” was being played in 
the business world, stating that, “In the zeal to satisfy consensus earnings 
estimates and project a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking may be winning 
the day over faithful representation. Managing may be giving way to 
manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion” (Levitt, 1998).  
Information quality characterizes a firm in terms of accuracy of its financial 
statements, being financial reporting of key interest to investors, analysts and 
board members, or simply to those relying on financial figures to reach 
investment decisions (DeGeorge et al, 1999).  
In this sense, the extent to which firms alter reported earnings in their own benefit 
prevails has a central issue to both theoretical and empirical research in 
accounting.  
Within accounting literature, a variety of terms are presented as synonymous to 
earnings management, providing for lack of consensus as to their exact 
definition. However, Healy and Wahlen enable the establishment of a 
comprehensive definition by stating that ‘Earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers’ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
Chittendem, Hall and Hutchinson (1995) expose the extent to which financial 
structure relates to a firm’s age, while raising broader issues on the prevailing 
relationship between financial structure and stage of development, as well as on 
size, growth rate and access to the capital market. Their results point to 
significant relationships between firms’ financial structure and age, and to the 
containment of economic growth within firms deriving from over-reliance on 
internally-available funds.  
In this sense, finance literature widely regards mature firms with deteriorating 
earnings, as the variability of stock returns presents itself negatively related with 
incorporation age (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005), while, simultaneously, 
investors’ uncertainty appears to lessen as firms grow older (Pástor and Veronesi, 
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2003). Furthermore, financial constraints, more prevalent within startup firms, 
prevent firms from raising all the funds necessary for the marginal product of 
capital to equal its opportunity cost (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001). 
In light of the above, this study aims to investigate the prevalence of the use of 
accruals to temporarily improve or reduce reported earnings, depicted as a 
mechanism for earnings management, by startup and mature non-financial 
firms, established in Spain and Portugal, through analyzing performances 
through the years 2007 to 2012. 
By engaging in accruals-based earnings management, it becomes possible for a 
firm to increase or decrease their income as they see fit by creating accruals. Thus, 
firms can create accruals in order to manipulate changes in reported earnings 
(discretionary accruals), which fall into the category of earnings management 
and impact cash flows. Being that information quality can be questioned from 
the moment earnings figures are interfered with, analyzing firms in regard to 
accruals-based earnings management becomes compliant with this dissertation’s 
premise. 
In line with these motivations, the present study embraces the following research 
questions: i) is there a difference between accruals-based earnings management 
within startup firms and mature firms?; and, ii) do startup firms manage their 
earnings more than mature firms? 
The study by Francis et al (2005) if relied upon in examining firms’ information 
quality and earnings management behavior across different years of 
establishment. This study relies on the Dechow-Dichev Model enhanced through 
the modified Jones Model approach, which reducing the pre-existing link to 
information risk. 
As far as results are concerned, preliminarily, startup firms appear to present 
higher levels of discretionary accruals prevailing within them, as, through the 
estimation of the Dechow-Dichev Model’s residuals, which isolate discretionary 
accruals.  
Onwards, the estimated standard deviation in regard to residuals (which 
provides for a measure to information quality) presents an average value 
superior within mature firms compared to that obtained in regard to startup 
firms, thus entailing lower levels of information quality prevailing, in average, 
within the former, rather than the latter.  
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Firms’ year of establishment ultimately influences negatively their information 
quality, providing for a more substantial negative effect upon startup firms. 
The remaining of this dissertation is as follows: chapter 1 discusses information 
quality and earnings management, presenting the theoretical component behind 
the regressions to be performed, also addressing the impact of financial 
instability within earnings quality; chapter 2 outlines the data and sample from 
which the metrics in the dissertation are derived; chapter 3 provides the results 
and findings from the statistical analysis performed, enabling the comparison of 
startup firms and mature firms; finally, the conclusion chapter presents the  













Chapter 1: Background 
1.1 – Information quality and earnings management 
Business decisions base themselves upon provided information, whether they’re 
made by large corporations or by individual investors.  
Several authors have expressed their thoughts on what information quality 
regards, with Kahn et al (2002) establishing it as the intrinsic characteristics 
needed to meet or exceed customers’ expectations while obeying to specific 
requirements or specifications; English (1996) determining that it means 
“consistently meeting customers’ expectations and through information and 
information services enabling them to perform their job effectively”; and, Eppler 
(2002) describing it as those informational characteristics needed to fulfill its 
users’ requirements. 
Despite how disperse information quality’s meanings may be, it becomes 
possible to state that all revolve around the same metrics, with Wang and Strong 
(1996) grouping them in a hierarchical form (refer to Figure 1 in Appendix I). This 
interpretation presents itself pertinent in terms of how well it captures today’s 
view of what a firm’s characteristics should be, closely resembling much of those 
assumptions verified in an audit to a company’s financial statements and those 
that can be stated as “socially desirable”, as are intrinsic, representational, 
accessibility and contextual data quality. 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) establish what earnings quality is by adopting 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1’s language, stating that higher 
earnings quality shall translate into more and relevant information regarding 
features of a firm’s financial performance being provided.  
Firms are ultimately meant to prepare financial statements that meet the specified 
characteristics herein, being the quality of their financial information output 
reliant on how they fulfill their informational users’ needs.  
In this sense, information quality becomes the object of questions when the above 
specified requirements are not met, leading its users and the market to 
misinformed conclusions and subsequently misinformed decisions.  
Being the single most important item found in any company’s financial 
statements undoubtedly earnings, as they signal firms in terms of their value, due 
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to their stock’s theoretical value corresponding to the present value of their future 
earnings, a firm’s maintenance relies on them and the incentives to keep earnings 
up are obvious. Thus, it becomes feasible that a firm’s financial information loses 
quality when their earnings are misrepresented. 
Prior to discussing what earnings management and, ultimately, financial 
information quality regard, it becomes crucial to establish the distinction between 
manipulation and fraud.  
Fraud involving a firm’s finances is commonly classified as white-collar crime, 
which, according to Gottschalk (2012), presents clear components, such as: 
deceitfulness; intentionality; trust breaching; involves losses; the possibility to be 
concealed; and, an appearance of outward respectability. The underlying 
psychology of a fraud can be described as fraud’s triangle, which involves three 
dimensions: motivation (from one’s living condition to ego), rationalization and 
opportunity. When a fraud actually takes place, a firm can become one of two: a 
perpetrator or a victim of the crime. A firm becomes a perpetrator of the crime 
when its employees or managers are the ones committing financial crime, and it 
becomes the victim of the crime when suffering a loss due to offenses committed 
by employees or managers, compounding a situation commonly referred to as 
occupational fraud. 
Li, McDowell and Moore (2008) define earnings management as the selection of 
accounting policies to achieve a desired financial reporting result, becoming 
possible to state that, usually, earnings management does not occur because of 
intentional fraud, but rather due to the zenith of a sequence of aggressive 
interpretations of accounting rules combined with a sequence of aggressive 
operating activities.  
Shedding light on how much firms “invest” in maintaining high earnings or, at 
most, avoiding losses, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence on firms’ 
management of their reported earnings through cash flow from operations and 
working capital in order to avoid losses and prevent earnings from decreasing; 
Hayn (1995) reports on a point of discontinuity around zero for firms’ earnings, 
concluding on the lengths firms go to manage their earnings from being negative; 
and Cunha (2013) also sheds light on the discontinuity of firms’ earnings around 
zero, although in a perspective of methods for detecting earnings management. 
In this sense, recent research, as provided by Libby et al (2009), shows that it is 
the discretionary vacuity in accounting standards that allows for earnings 
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management decisions. Gaps left for decisions to be made come to depend on the 
accounting model a country follows. Nelson, Elliot and Tarpley (2002) compare 
accounting standards to types of earnings management, indicating that managers 
are actually more likely to make earnings management decisions through 
transactions in a rules-based setting (the most prominent example of a country 
with a rules-based accounting system being the United States) and that, in a 
principles-based setting (as Europe largely has), accounting decisions are more 
likely to be made. Van Beest (2009) ultimately finds that neither rules-based, nor 
principles-based accounting standards are able to eliminate earnings 
management decisions. 
In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act came in response to several 
corporate scandals taking place from 2002 on and involving firms as Enron, 
Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, and others, which provided for subsequent 
retrenchment in investor confidence, and enabled the targeting of earnings 
manipulation. 
Moreover, the specific purpose of this act was to improve transparency and 
corporate governance, specifically related to the auditing of Securities and 
Exchange Commission registrants. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s key implications 
consisted in the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in 
order to regulate accounting firms responsible for regulations companies 
subjected to Securities and Exchange Commission reporting requirements (or 
Securities and Exchange Commission issuers); in expanded auditor 
independence requirements; in enhanced financial disclosure requirements for 
Securities and Exchange Commission issuers; enhanced the role and 
independence of audit committees; mandated corporate governance reforms; 
and, created new criminal laws relating to corporate misconduct. 
Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) actually expose how earnings management prevailed 
in different forms before and after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, due to 
the above mentioned changes in government and accounting policies. A 
prevalence of accrual-based earnings management before the passage of the act 
versus a prevalence of real earnings management after the said passage is 
exposed, thus shading light on how the United States’ policies have helped 
change the course of malpractices incurred by firms. 
The European Union has also taken steps to increase transparency and improve 
corporate governance practices. The most important examples include: the 
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European Union Transparency Directive, which increases the transparency 
obligations of firms whose securities are admitted to trading within a regulated 
market and it also has the twofold aim of improving the quality and punctuality 
of information made available to investors as well as removing national barriers 
imposed on issuers and thereby helping to integrate the EU’s securities market; 
the Money Laundering Directive, imposesing that financial institutions and 
accountants, tax advisers, lawyers and notaries are required to identify their 
clients, as well as cooperating fully with authorities responsible for combating 
money laundering by informing those authorities of any fact which might 
indicate money laundering; and, the EU Statutory Audit Directive, which is the 
most comprehensive single European Union legislative initiative to impact the 
audit profession, with key provisions being introduced in areas such as auditing 
standards, public oversight, auditor independence, third country auditors, 
definition of a network and ownership and control of audit firms, thus aiming to 
ensure reliance on the accuracy of audited accounts for investors and other 
interested parties.  
Approaching real earnings management, Schipper (1989) describes them as an 
intended intervention in the financial reporting process through timing 
investment or financial decision to alter reported earnings or part of them. As 
Roychowdhury (2006) exposes, real earnings management can be achieved 
through activities such as price discounts (temporarily increasing sales), 
overproduction (originating a lower cost of goods sold) and reduction of 
discretionary expenditures (in order to improve reported margins), among 
others, with Graham et al (2004) actually finding that 78% of executives are 
willing to incur in these to manage financial reporting perceptions. Real earnings 
management usually ends up hurting long term financial results in benefit of 
short term ones. 
In regard to accruals-based earnings management, it can be stated that accruals 
equal to the difference between a firm’s net income and its cash flows. By 
engaging in accruals-based earnings management, it becomes possible for them 
to increase or decrease their income as they see fit by creating accruals, and to 
actually create accruals in order to manipulate changes in reported earnings 
(discretionary accruals), which fall into the category of earnings management. 
Earnings manipulation through discretionary accruals can be carried on through 
different methods: Moehrle (2002) reported firms using restructuring accruals 
reversals to beat analysts’ forecasts; Robb (1998) exposed the greater use of loan 
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loss provisions made by bank managers to manage earnings upwards when 
analysts reach a consensus regarding a firm’s earnings’ prediction; and Payne & 
Robb (2000) concluded that firms showing pre-managed earnings below 
analysts’ expectations tend to have greater positive abnormal accruals. When 
compiling evidence from different countries, Li, McDowell and Moore (2008) 
find an indication that earnings management appears to be a universal 
phenomenon. 
Other than the methods to achieve them, real earnings management and 
accruals-based earnings management differ on their impact, with the first 
impacting earnings and the latter impacting cash flows. Being that information 
quality can be questioned from the moment earnings figures are interfered with, 
analyzing firms regarding accruals-based earnings management becomes 
compliant with this dissertation’s premise. 
The willingness to engage in earnings management, regardless of what kind, can 
be said to have general incentives and subjective ones. Dechow et al (1995) find 
that factors as corporate control contests, capital market motives, competitive 
considerations, contractual motives and personal considerations make up 
incentives motivating companies to engage in earnings management. DeGeorge 
et al (1999) present incentives based on thresholds companies must fulfill: report 
positive profits, sustain recent performances and meet analysts’ forecasts. 
From a general to a subjective basis, we can say that differently aged firms’ 
incentives come from the different needs and market expectations characterizing 
them. Raising capital comes differently for those firms starting up and those who 
have already established themselves. Different stages of a firms’ life therefore 
mean different capital raising methods. The hypothesis to be developed 
throughout this dissertation places different sources of financing and different 
capital structure needs as the basilar reason why different accruals-based 
earnings management might prevail.  
Recent surveys on current and potential entrepreneurs indicate that gaining 
adequate access to capital is one of the biggest hurdles of starting a new business 
(Kerr and Nanda, 2009). While theoretical research and empirical investigations 
have centered themselves on large mature firms, which are able to finance 
themselves through various channels, from stock equity to commercial paper, 
not much is known about the capital structure of startup firms. Knowing, 
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however, that startup firms mainly struggle to get initial funding, the question 
arises: do startup firms manage their earnings more than mature firms? 
1.2 – Financial crisis and earnings quality 
As this dissertation covers the periods relating to the last global financial crisis, 
it should be expected that information quality’s evolution within firms is 
interpreted accounting for the above specified context, thus allowing for a vis-à-
vis understanding. 
The 2007/8 global financial crisis deeply impacted Portugal and Spain, and it can 
be traced back to August 2007, when the first phase of the global financial crisis 
erupted, enabling the initiation of liquidity operations performed by the 
European Central Bank, and being deeply correlated with the high exposure of 
European banks to losses within the United States market, as developed by 
McGuire and von Peter (2009), Acharya and Schnabl (2010) and Shin (2012), 
having posteriorly developed in 2008 into a more acute phase, due to the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers. 
In regard to the effect of financial crisis within earnings quality, Kousenidis et al 
(2013) focus on European countries characterized by a weak fiscal sustainability 
while under the supervision of the European Union, achieving findings 
supporting the hypothesis that earnings management appears to decrease during 
the financial crisis. However, Chen et al (2010), as well as Habib et al (2013), 
provide for support on how firms appear to manage their respective earnings 
downward during financial crises, more specifically when experiencing financial 
distress or losses.  
Furthermore, additional empirical evidence suggests that firms do engage in 
aggressive earnings management throughout periods of financial crisis (Chia et 
al, 2007; Johl et al, 2007). Since a financial crisis will generally provide for a 
systematic decline in firms’ income, engaging in earnings management might be 
triggered or magnified (Kim and Yi, 2006), with firms disregarding losses as they 
appear to derive from the macroeconomic shock. 
The global financial crisis’ effects deepened within European economies since 
2008, with specificities within European countries exacerbating the situation, as 
occurs within Spain, whose economy had developed a so-called property bubble 
fuelled by artificial low interest rates (Karanikolos et al, 2013), and Portugal, 
which suffers from low growth rates and stagnation since 2001 (Lourtie, 2015), 
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and with both countries combining said setups with undertaking significant 
debt. 
The countries’ sovereign debt levels began growing at a rapid pace in 2009 
(World Bank, 2015), due to falling tax revenues and increased spending, mainly 
reporting to bank bailouts and costs of unemployment, being followed by the 
undertaking of austerity policies, which account for an extremely controversial 
matter, due to the negative pressure placed on economic growth (International 














Chapter 2: Data 
2.1 - Database 
The database used for the purposes of this study was obtained through SABI 
database, which, at the time, comprises information regarding to two thousand 
Spanish firms and five-hundred thousand Portuguese firms, with the date of 
establishment of envisaged firms expanding from 1498 to 2013, inclusively. 
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Due to the substantially higher proportion of Spanish firms in relation to 
Portuguese firms present in this database, it is acceptable to express that Spanish 
firms ultimately prevail over Portuguese ones, as far as the applicability of this 
study’s findings is concerned.  
For the purposes of this study, and in concern to the stratification of each firm, 
multiple selection criterions were applied, therefore reducing the envisaged 
original sample (refer to Table 1 in Appendix II). Selection criterion aims to 
exclude firms reporting absent, non-provided or unavailable data, and those 
firms that present themselves as distinct outliers. 
Thus, firm-year observations related to variables reporting current and total 
assets, cash, profit and losses before and after tax, which present no information, 
were excluded. Furthermore, provided the construction of those variables 
necessary to enable the replication of the Dechow-Dichev Model, unavailable 
data was also excluded from the following generated variables: total current 
accruals, cash flow from operations from the previous year, cash flow from 
operations from the following year and property, plant and equipment. In 
addition, outliers reported within the sample’s 1st and 99th percentiles were also 
excluded, hence allowing for the normalization of the envisaged sample. 
Despite the original sample incorporating financial information reprising from 
2005 to 2013, as a result of applying selection criterion and creating variables 
comprising change within periods, the final sample is analyzed from year 2007 
through to 2012. As such, findings achieved here shall report to those years and 
will be analyzed considering macroeconomic developments within them. 
2.2 - Summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the variables is provided within Table 4 (please refer to 
Appendix II) and throughout this section an interpretation of variables deemed 
relevant is delivered. 
When estimating the Dechow-Dichev Model a division occurs creating two 
Versions of the Model, which are equivalent with exception to the variable used 
as debt (refer to Section 3.1.2 for further insight). Following the creation of two 
Versions, variables total current accruals, cash flow from operations, change in 
debt and total accruals, become specific to each Version, while variables change 
in revenue, property, plant and equipment, change in current assets, change in 
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current liabilities, change in cash, depreciation and net income, are common to 
both. 
To the effect of this study, the interpretation of variables will only enclose those 
specific to Version 1 and Version 2 of the Dechow-Dichev Model, due to their 
central and dependent role. 
In regard to the dependent variable within the Dechow-Dichev Model, total 
current accruals, it presents a maximum value of Euro 2.941,18 under Version 1 
and a larger maximum value of Euro 4.576,21 under Version 2. For both Versions, 
the minimum value is negative, with Version 2 presenting a minimum value of 
Euro 4.712,95, thus surpassing Version 1, which presents a minimum value of 
Euro 3.020,95. This variable’s mean reprises a negative value, also under both 
Versions, presenting a value of Euro -0,11 under Version 1 and Euro -0,42 under 
Version 2. Version 1 presents a median value of Euro 0,04, while Version 2’s 
median value is null. 
The variables interpreted hereinafter compose explanatory variables in the 
Dechow-Dichev Model, being those cash flow from operations, change in debt 
and total accruals. 
The variable cash flow from operations presents a maximum value of Euro 
4.038,93 under Version 1 and a larger maximum value of Euro 5.804,09 under 
Version 2. Relating to the minimum, under Version 1 it assumes a negative value 
of Euro 2.599,64, while under Version 2 it assumes an also negative but larger 
value of Euro 4.293,01. This variable’s mean assumes a value of Euro 32,71 for 
Version 1 and a value of 33,03 for Version 2. Both Versions present similar median 
values, with Version 1 presenting a value of Euro 10,44 and Version 2 presenting 
a value of Euro 10,25. 
Regarding the variable change in debt, it reprises a maximum value of Euro 
1.431,87 under Version 1 and a larger maximum value of Euro 2.129,58 under 
Version 2. Both Versions present a negative minimum value, with Euro 1.414,79 
under Version 1 and, a larger value, Euro 2.107,96 under Version 2. Version 1 
presents a mean value of Euro 0,37, larger than Version 2, which presents a mean 
value of Euro 0,05. Both Versions present a null median value. 
The variable total accruals presents a maximum value of Euro 2.554,17 under 
Version 1 and a larger maximum value of Euro 4.322,24 under Version 2. Both 
Versions present a negative minimum, with Version 1 presenting a value of Euro 
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3.511,43 and Version 2 presenting a larger value of Euro 5.303,33. Under Version 
1, the mean is negative, assuming a value of Euro 24,59, while under Version 2, 
the mean assumes a similar negative value to Version 1, of Euro 24,91. In 
addition, both Versions present negative medians, with Version 1 presenting a 
value of Euro 8,11 and Version 2 presenting a value of 7,66. 
It is possible to state, in relation to the variables interpreted here, that, although 
Version 1 and Version 2 vary across the percentiles in a close manner, Version 2’s 
values range to a wider spectrum of values, both on maximum and minimum 
levels, when compared to Version 1. 
2.3 - Testing requirements 
As it is stated by DeVocht (2002) a regression is not to be used to estimate 
residuals if it does not meet one or more of three of the following requirements: 
normality, homoskedasticity and linearity. 
Firstly, data is analyzed in regard to its normal distribution. Therefore, histogram 
charts are created, graphically presented the spread of total current accruals over 
total assets for both Versions of the Dechow-Dichev Model. Through verifying 
Graphics 1 and 2 (refer to Appendix III), the considered ratio presents an almost 
perfectly bell-shaped curve under both Versions, partially supporting the normal 
distribution characterizing this Model. 
Secondly, Probability-Probability (or, “P-P”) plots are created for both variations 
of the Model, thus comparing the empirical cumulative distribution function of 
the data set with a specified theoretical cumulative distribution function. Since 
the normal functions total current accruals over total assets seem to follow a 
straight line under both Versions, the normal distribution of the data can be 
confirmed (refer to Graphics 3 and 4 in Appendix III). 
Being normality confirmed, there is a need to test data for homoskedasticity, or 
the “constant variance” assumption, which states that the unobservable (or error) 
has the same variance given any value of the explanatory variable, thus 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢|𝑥) = 𝜎2 . Homoskedasticity is tested by creating a scatter plot of the 
predicted variable and the regression residuals. It is possible to conclude through 
Graphics 5 and 6 (refer to Appendix III) that heteroskedasticity is present in this 




As a solution for the heteroskedasticity and non-linearity problems presented, 









Chapter 3: Empirical Analysis 
3.1 – Hypothesis 
Being the primary focus of this dissertation to study differently aged firms 
regarding accruals-based earnings management incurrence and, ultimately, their 
information quality, firms are firstly divided into startup firms and mature firms, 
and subsequently a measure of accruals quality Model is performed upon them. 
Because startups account for a more volatile type of firm, we can determine that 
their incentives to manage earnings can exceed mature firms’ incentives to 
manage theirs, and so determine our hypothesis to be: 
H0: Startup firms present stronger evidence of accruals-based earnings 
management (and, thus, less information quality) than mature firms 
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Additionally, firms’ behavior throughout pre and post-crisis periods is analyzed 
throughout the dissertation, with startup firms being constantly compared to 
mature ones. Towards the end, information quality is also analyzed in terms of 
the terms of financing a company incurs in and its size. It is expected that a 
conclusion is reached regarding the above specified main hypothesis and to 
perceive how intrinsic and extrinsic environment plays a role, additionally to a 
firm’s age. 
3.1.1 – Theoretical Model 
Measuring accruals quality will entail the use of the measure of accruals quality 
developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). This Model measures abnormal 
accruals (discretionary accruals) as the residuals from regressions of changes in 
working capital on past, present and future operating cash flows, as stated by Shi 
& Zhou (2012). 
As Dechow & Dichev (2002) state, accurate accruals estimates imply a solid 
match between current accruals and past, present and future cash flow 
realizations, while imprecise or erroneous estimates actually reduce the 
beneficial role of accruals.  
As suggested in Francis et al (2005), because the Dechow-Dichev Model is limited 
to current accruals, this dissertation also considers proxies for accruals quality 
that are based on the absolute value of abnormal accruals. Those will be 
estimated through the modified Jones Model (Dechow et al, 1995). The modified 
Jones approach suggests that accruals quality is related to the extent to which 
accruals are well captured by fitted values obtained by regressing total accruals 
on changes in revenues and property, plant and equipment, being that it 
identifies abnormal accruals as those that are not explained by the said change in 
revenues and property, plant and equipment. The limitation prevailing within 
the Dechow-Dichev Model is addressed by applying the modified Jones 
approach, thus reducing the link to information risk (Francis et al, 2005). 
Therefore, the metric used throughout this dissertation bases itself on the cross-
sectional Dechow-Dichev Model, augmented with the fundamental variables 
from the modified Jones Model, as used in Francis et al (2005): 





𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = Total Current Accruals in year t; 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s Cash Flow from Operations in year t;   
𝑁𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s Net Income in year t; 
𝑇𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑗,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡  = Firm j’s total accruals in 
year t;  
𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s change in current assets between year t-1 and year t;  
𝛥𝐶𝐿𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s change in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; 
𝛥𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t;  
𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s change in debt between year t-1 and year t; 
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t;  
𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s change in revenues between year t-1 and year t;  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 = Firm j’s gross value of PPE in year t. 
A first estimation of the Dechow-Dichev Model will allow us to separate non-
discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals, which are presented in the 
form of residuals 𝑢𝑗,𝑡. By isolating the residuals’ standard deviation, we achieve 
a quality measure for firm information, thus fulfilling the primary goal of this 
dissertation. 
3.1.2 – Specifications 
Throughout this study, the chosen Model presented above will be estimated 
twice within each step incurred, its residuals and, ultimately, its residuals’ 
standard deviation.  
The first estimation will regard the variable loans as debt, thus originating 
Version 1 of the Dechow-Dichev Model, while the second estimation will regard 
liabilities as debt, making Version 2 of the same Model.  
This takes place due to the different interpretations debt is subject to across 
different economies. European countries tend to regard debt as liabilities, while 
countries such as the United States regard it as loans. As such, Version 1 applies 
the Anglo-Saxony perspective, under which debt corresponds to a firm’s loans, 
and Version 2 adopts the European standpoint, under which debt refers to a 
firm’s liabilities. This specification is perceived to further enrich this dissertation, 
while allowing for more accurate and realistic findings. 
In addition, assessing information quality within differently aged firms translates 
into dividing those under analysis.  
To the effect of the present study, firms are divided between startup firms and 
mature firms, being the former determined as those established after 2007, and 
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the latter as those established before the said year (note that, as specified 
previously, analyzed data covers the years from 2007 through to 2012). 
3.2 – Graphical Evidence 
This section introduces precedes the empirical analysis by presenting evidence 
through contrasting the evolution of discretionary accruals calculated under both 
estimated Versions for the Dechow-Dichev Model with both countries’ Gross 
Domestic Product’s evolution from 2007 to 2012, obtaining a fair comparison 
between the evolution of accruals suggesting discretionarity and the respective 
countries’ environment. 
In this sense, Graphics 7 and 8 (refer to Appendix III) were obtained, with the 
first presenting change in discretionary accruals throughout the years 2007 to 
2012 in regard to the yearly average of considered Portuguese and Spanish 
companies and the latter projecting each considered country’s Gross Domestic 
Product. 
Average discretionary accruals calculated per year present different evolutions 
throughout the considered time period when estimated under Versions 1 and 2 
of the Dechow-Dichev Model.  
In regard to the year 2007, average discretionary accruals present significant (in 
context to the remaining years under analysis) positive values under both 
Versions, with Version 1 presenting, however, a larger positive value than 
Version 2.  From 2007 to 2008, average discretionary accruals assume a negative 
trend under both Versions of the Model, while, in regard to the countries’ Gross 
Domestic Product, both show a positive trend from 2007 to 2008. 
In the year 2008, average discretionary accruals under Version 2 become negative 
and remain just over zero under Version 1, experiencing a steep decrease from 
the average value in 2007, while, in regard to Spain and Portugal’s Gross 
Domestic Product, in line with economic developments throughout 2008, a 
negative trend arises and is maintained through to 2011. 
From 2008 to 2009, Version 1 and Version 2 present opposite trends, with average 
discretionary accruals for the year 2009, under Version 1, rising from 2007’s 
value, while, under Version 2, the negative trend appears to deepen. Between 
2009 and 2010, opposite trends characterize average discretionary accruals again, 
although the roles are inverted, with Version 1’s average discretionary accruals 
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for the year 2010 coming close to zero, although remaining positive, and Version 
2’s remaining negative, though with a lesser value. Both Versions’ trends are 
reprised from 2010 to 2011, with Version 1’s average discretionary accruals for 
the year 2010 assuming a negative value and a more explicit change than Version 
2’s, which remain negative. Between 2010 and 2011, a change in trend occurs in 
relation to both countries’ Gross Domestic Product, which evolves positively. 
Lastly, from 2011 to 2012, Version 1’s average discretionary accruals maintains a 
negative trend to more explicit negative values, while, under Version 2, average 
discretionary accruals for the year reprise the positive trend happening since 
2009, becoming closer to zero, although remaining negative. From 2011 to 2012, 
both countries’ Gross Domestic Product return to a negative trend. 
Opposing average discretionary accruals throughout the considered years under 
both Versions shows a different evolution deriving from distinct forms of debt. 
Version 1 of the Dechow-Dichev Model, which accounts for loans as debt, 
provides for larger fluctuations than Version 2, which considers liabilities as debt. 
An analysis to the former’s evolution leads to conclude that two steep decreases 
occur, with a mild upwards fluctuation in between, while the same analysis 
conducted towards the latter verifies that, although from 2007 to 2008 a steeper 
decrease than that verified under Version 1 occurs, average discretionary 
accruals remain negative, without explicit fluctuations, evolving from a negative 
trend to a positive trend. 
From 2007 to 2008, negative trends for average discretionary accruals under both 
Versions compare the positive trend presented for the countries’ Gross Domestic 
Product. However, from 2008 to 2011, only Version 1’s evolution remains largely 
opposing those within the countries’ Gross Domestic Product, with Version 2’s 
largely changing in the same direction. From 2011 to 2012, there is a reversion, 
with Version 1 following the Gross Domestic Product’s evolution and Version 2 
opposing it. 
Graphical evidence presented within this section enables to conclude how the 
2007-2008 global financial crisis affected the accounting of Total Current 
Accruals, with its effects becoming expressively clear when it comes to 
discretionary accruals, as their medium yearly values under both Versions fall 
from positive levels to values close to zero (positive and negative). As the global 
financial crisis broke in 2007, it is possible to interpret this as a delay within 
discretionary accruals in regard to its response to an economic downturn. 
Additionally, the decrease of discretionary accruals in the midst of a financial 
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crisis broke is compatible with the methodology underlying earnings 
management, since it is expected that companies take advantage of an economic 
downturn to present as much losses as possible, thus creating accruals to be 
reversed in the following years, and enabling them to afterwards present positive 
earnings. 
3.3 – Pearson’s Correlation Test 
Pearson’s correlation test is widely regarded to verify prevailing correlations 
between variables when estimating residuals. Said correlations can be used to 
assess the explanatory power of variables, assuming negative, positive or null 
values, with the latter indicating the absence of correlation.  A correlation 
presenting a positive value of 1 indicates a perfect positive correlation, while a 
correlation presenting a negative value of -1 indicates the opposite, a perfect 
negative correlation. The correlation value is shown by Model with the 
significance value in the form of a P value. 
The Pearson correlation test is performed for both Versions of the Dechow-
Dichev Model, with those relationships deemed most significant being identified 
with double asterisk (refer to Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix II) and analyzed here. 
Within both Versions of the Dechow-Dichev Model, the relationship between 
total and discretionary accruals’ variables is presented as being negative and 
highly significant (Version 1: -0,01 p=0,00; Version 2: -0,01 p=0,00). The 
constituted negative relationship between these variables entails that, if total 
current accruals increase (or decrease) the discretionary accruals will decrease (or 
increase) accordingly.  
Total current accruals similarly present a significant relationship with the cash 
flow from operations’ variables included in the Dechow-Dichev Model. Firstly, 
under Versions 1 and 2 the relationship between cash flow from operations from 
the previous year (n-1) and total current accruals is positive and highly 
significant (Version 1: 0,05 p=0,00; Version 2: 0,06 p=0,00).  
Secondly, the same positive and highly significant relationship prevails within 
cash flow from operations for the following year and total current accruals 
(Version 1: 0,07 p=0,00; Version 2: 0,08 p=0,00). Both relationships present 
themselves weaker under Version 2, when compared to Version 1, as it should 
be noted that, a positive relationship between variables provides for an increase 
(or decrease) in one variable when the other increases (or decreases).  
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Although cash flow from operations from the previous and following years 
correlate positively with total current accruals, lastly, and in regard to cash flow 
from operations for the current year’s relationship with total current accruals, a 
negative and highly significant one is presented for both versions (Version 1: -
0,97 p=0,00; Version 2: -0,93 p=0,00), thus counteracting the pattern for the prior 
and following years. Furthermore, both Versions present, under this last 
relationship, correlation values close to -1, indicating an almost perfect negative 
correlation.  
The above stated relationships between total current accruals and cash flow from 
operations for the years prior, current and posterior provide insight on how time 
preponderates in relation to cash flow and accruals, by presenting a mild but 
significant positive correlation between cash flow obtained in the years prior and 
posterior and total accruals and an almost perfect negative correlation when the 
year under analysis is the current one.  
Moreover, change in revenue and total current accruals present a positive and 
significant relationship under both Versions (Version 1: 0,02 p=0,00; Version 2: 
0,01 p=0,00), thus entailing that change in revenue varies in line with total current 
accruals under both. It should be noted that, although this relationship remains 
positive for Versions 1 and 2, it is weaker under the latter. As Versions 1 and 2 
differ only in the variable assumed as debt, these difference might indicate how 
forms of financing ultimately determine how total accruals and revenue affect 
each other. 
Property, plant and equipment and total current accruals present a negative and 
significant relationship under both versions (Version 1: -0,01 p=0,00; Version 2: -
0,03 p=0,00), with the former, thus, varying oppositely to the latter, and with the 
relationship under Version 2 presenting itself stronger than the same relationship 
under Version 1.  
The correlation value for the age dummy variable and total current accruals gives 
an indication of a possible trend. Under both Versions the correlation value is 
found to be insignificant (Version 1: 0,00 p=0,71; Version 2: 0,00 p=0,50), which 
could indicate that there is no relationship between total accruals and a 
company’s age. 
The Pearson correlation test performed provides for a first indication of absence 
of correlation between the dummy variable Age, which splits the timeline into 
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companies founded before 2007 and from 2007 on, and total current accruals, as 
well as residuals (or discretionary accruals). 
3.4 – Testing the hypothesis 
3.4.1 - Estimating the Dechow-Dichev Model 
Herein, the results for both estimated Versions of the Dechow-Dichev Model are 
presented in the form of a table (refer to Table 5 in Appendix II) becoming 
important to reiterate that the existence of two Versions of the same Model arises 
from the different outtakes that prevail in regard to debt across different 
economies. With the Model’s estimation regarding this distinction, findings are 
enabled, not only in regard to the prevalence of discretionary accruals within 
startup firms and mature firms, but also in relation to how different stages of a 
company’s lives and, thus, their external financing interfere. 
Within the Dechow-Dichev Model, and as established priory, the dependent 
variable is total current accruals, which will be explained by a set of explanatory 
variables, as well as an error. Through a first estimation the Model’s constituted 
Versions insight is enabled in regard to the said variable as a whole, including 
both discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. The remaining residuals 
present an estimation of the error itself capturing discretionary accruals only, as 
exposed in the following section. 
Focusing first on Version 1 for the Dechow-Dichev Model, it is possible to state, 
in regard to the constant value, that, when all regressors equal zero, the value 
Euro 9.33 translates the medium total current accruals value for startup firms. 
The same value for mature firms equals Euro 16,72, considerably larger. 
Secondly, and in regard to the estimated Version 2 of the Dechow-Dichev Model, 
Euro 11,23 reports to the medium value of total current accruals for startup firms, 
presenting itself larger than under Version 1. For mature firms, the same value, 
under the same conditions, equals Euro 19,39, also exceeding the same value 
when estimated under Version 1 and, in line with said Version 1, surpassing 
startup firms’ constant. 
The estimated coefficient for cash flow from operations for the previous year 
under Version 1 indicates that, in average, ceteris paribus, an additional unit of 
cash flow from operations in the previous year is associated with an additional 
percentage of 9% (
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝐴1
𝜕𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑛−1
= 𝛽1) of total current accruals when it comes to startup 
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firms, while under Version 2, the additional percentage is 4%. Regarding mature 
firms, this value decreases to 4% under Version 1 and presents itself null under 
Version 2. 
When cash flow from operations regards the current year, in average, ceteris 




= 𝛽2) of total current accruals in regard to startup firms under Version 1 
and a reduced percentage of 92% under Version 2. Mature firms present an 
equally reduced percentage with larger values of 87% under Version 1 and of 
95% under Version 2. 
In regard to the estimated coefficient for cash flow from operations from the 
following year, it indicates that, in average, ceteris paribus, an additional unit of is 
associated with an additional percentage of 9% (
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝐴1
𝜕𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑛+1
= 𝛽3) of total current 
accruals for startup firms under Version 1 and an additional percentage of 5% 
under Version 2. The same coefficient for mature firms presents a value of 4% 
under Version 1 and a value of 1% under Version 2.  
These results are in line with those correlations identified within the previous 
section, stating a proportionally stronger negative impact on total current 
accruals from cash flow from operations obtained in the current year and a 
proportionally weaker positive impact deriving from cash flow from operations 
obtained in the years prior and posterior.  
The estimated coefficient for change in revenue indicates that, as estimated under 
Version 1, in average, ceteris paribus, an additional unit between the previous and 




= 𝛽4)  of total current accruals in regard to startup firms and a 
similar additional percentage of 6% in regard to mature Firms. In regard for 
Version 2, change in revenue’s impact is similar to that obtained under Version 
1, with a positive impact of 6% on startup firms and a positive impact of 7% on 
mature firms. 
The estimated coefficient for property, plant and equipment, as estimated under 
Version 1, indicates that, in average, ceteris paribus, an additional unit is 
associated with a reduced percentage of 2% (
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝐴1
𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐸
= 𝛽5)  for total current 
accruals when it comes to startup firms and a reduced percentage of 4% for 
mature firms. Under Version 2, values present themselves in line with Version 1, 
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although minimally larger, as an additional unit of property, plant and 
equipment induces a reduced percentage of 3% of total current accruals on 
startup firms and a reduced percentage of 5% on mature firms. 
Despite results obtained under Versions 1 and 2 being, in general terms, in all 
similar, mainly in regard to the estimated coefficients for change in revenue and 
property, plant and equipment, it is possible to denote that cash flow from 
operations presents a more significant negative impact in regard to the current 
year and a lesser positive impact in regard to the years prior and posterior under 
the same, under Version 2. Furthermore, although in absolute terms the medium 
value for total current accruals is larger as a difference between startup firms and 
mature firms under Version 2, it presents higher levels for both under said 
Version, when compared to Version 1, thus associating higher levels of accruals 
when debt is taken into account as referring to liabilities, as is under Version 2. 
3.4.2 - Analyzing the Model’s residuals  
Through estimating Versions 1 and 2 constituted within the Dechow-Dichev 
Model, apart from obtaining coefficients for the explanatory variables, an error, 
or residuals, is also obtained. In this context, residuals compound discretionary 
accruals, which will be analyzed herein. 
Table 6 (refer to Appendix II) provides insight in regard to the prevalence of 
discretionary accruals in both startups and mature firms. For both estimated 
Versions of the Dechow-Dichev Model, coefficients for discretionary accruals in 
regard to mature firms assume values that translate into zero, in laic terms. As 
for startup firms, both Versions similarly present negative coefficients, with 
Version 2’s exceeding Version 1’s, translating the negative correlation prevailing 
between residuals and total current accruals (refer to Section 3.2). 
Through this opposition it becomes perceivable that discretionary accruals seem 
to play a bigger role within startup firms than within mature firms. Furthermore, 
results of the Dechow-Dichev Model’s estimation provide deeper insight relating 
to changes within discretionary accruals happening between differently aged 
firms. Through estimating the Model’s residuals, it is concluded that startup 
firms and discretionary accruals present a negative relationship, while mature 




Following the results within Table 6 it becomes valid to interpret that 
discretionary accruals play a proportionally more substantial role within startup 
firms than within mature firms. Moreover, debt taken into account as liabilities 
seems to account for added volatility within firms across the two age spectrums 
considered. 
3.4.3 - Analyzing information quality 
Through calculating the residuals’ standard deviation, an information quality 
measure for each firm is obtained. At this point, panel data is converted into 
cross-sectional data, which means that this indicator will only vary by firm and 
no longer by year. 
In order to confront mature and startup firms under both Versions, the average 
value for residuals’ standard deviation (the information quality measure) is 
presented in Table 7 (refer to Appendix II).  
The estimated Versions of the Dechow-Dichev Model present similar results 
relatively to both startups and mature firms, with the latter providing for a 
significantly larger coefficient than the former, which may indicate the 
prevalence of higher levels of manipulations, and thus a lower level of 
information quality prevailing within mature firms. 
Calculating the residuals’ (or discretionary accruals’) standard deviation allows 
for the computation of a manipulation indicator for each firm. The larger the 
values assumed by this indicator, the lesser the information quality provided by 
a firm. 
In order to obtain a stronger perspective of both types of firms’ information 
quality and how they might affect them, the information quality measure is 
regressed, through residuals’ standard deviation, along with variables year of 
establishment (the year in which a firm is created), employees (number of 
employees within a firm), cash (level of cash held by a firm), loans (bank loans), 
current liabilities (liabilities due within a year) and non-current liabilities 
(liabilities due in over an year, within the long run), being achieved results 
presented within Table 8 (refer to Appendix II). 
Focusing, firstly, on the year when firms were established, it becomes perceivable 
that it presents negative impact within information quality when it comes to 
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startup firms, and a small negative impact on mature firms, being the said impact 
more pronounced under Version 1 for startup firms. 
Moreover, the number of employees seems to affect positively both startups and 
mature firms, with a more evident impact on startup firms under Version 1 and 
a more evident impact on mature firms under Version 2. 
The level of cash a firm has available, provides for a similar positive impact on 
startup firms and mature firms, although more pronounce within the former, 
across both Versions of the Model. 
Debt taken into account as loans provides for a similar negative impact on 
information quality across both Versions for both mature and startup firms. Said 
impact is more pronounced in a negative manner relatively to startup firms 
under Version 2.  
Debt taken into account as liabilities impacts firms’ information quality 
positively, although more pronouncedly in the short run, as current liabilities 
present a stronger positive impact on both mature firms and startup firms across 
both Versions, than non-current liabilities do under the same terms. 
Taking into account the analysis exposed within the present section and sections 
prior, the initial perception that discretionary accruals increasingly prevail 
within startup firms in higher proportion than within mature firms, becomes 
dismissible as the created measure for information quality shows that its higher 
levels are present within mature firms rather than startup firms, thus entailing 
that the latter seem to present higher levels of information quality and, thus, 
lower levels of earnings management. 
Also, by regressing the information quality measure along with variables as the 
year of establishment of a firm, its number of employees, its level of cash 
available and its debt forms, it becomes apparent that all variables, although 
affecting mature and startup firms in the same direction, have a more 
pronounced effect on the latter, specially, and more pronouncedly, in regard to 
the effect of the year of establishment of a firm in its information quality within 
startups. 
However, our main hypothesis is rejected, since, although initial evidence may 
point for higher levels of discretionary accruals within startup firms, information 
quality seems to prevail in substantially higher terms within mature firms. 
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3.4.4 – Model’s adjustment quality and limitations 
The Model’s adjustment quality is translated by 𝑅2 ’s value, which is always 
placed  between zero and one, since the sum of the errors’ squares cannot exceed 
the total sum of squares. For interpretation purposes, 𝑅2’s value, as presented in 
Table 5 (refer to Appendix II) is multiplied by 100 in order to be analyzed as a 
percentage. 
Under Version 1, the analysis to 𝑅2 determines that 92% of startup firms’ total 
current accruals’ variability around the sample’s mean as being explained by it. 
For the same Version, it can also be concluded that 91% of mature firms’ total 
current accruals’ variability around the sample’s mean is explained. Under 
Version 2, 96% of startups and mature firms’ total current accruals’ variability 
around the sample’s mean is explained by the Dechow-Dichev Model. 
Hereupon, Versions 1 and 2 of the Dechow-Dichev Model present an acceptable 
adjustment quality, since they explain more than 80% of total current accruals’ 
variability around the sample’s mean, being 80% the percentage widely regarded 
as benchmark for suitable or unsuitable Models. 
In regard to the information quality measure’s regression (refer to Table 8 in 
Appendix II), 𝑅2 presents, within startup firms, a value of 23% and 22% under 
Versions 1 and 2, respectively. This entails the percentage of startup firms’ 
information quality variability around the sample’s mean that is explained by it. 
Concerning mature firms, this percentage presents itself with values of 37% and 
36% under Versions 1 and 2, respectively.  
However, it should be noted in this respect, that a low 𝑅2  doesn’t turn this 
regression into an inadequate one, thus remaining the likelihood of it constituting 
an acceptable assessment of the underlying ceteris paribus relationship.  
Following the specification of the Dechow-Dichev Model’s’ adjustment quality 
perceived, it is important to address limitations prevailing. Firstly, data gathered 
from SABI database might contain inaccurate representations of the firms’ 
financial data, as mistakes can be made upon entering data, thus negatively 
influencing the findings.  
Additionally, the chosen Model falls into the category of earnings management 
Models under efficient in isolating the proxy for accruals-based earnings 
management, which consists in discretionary accruals. In fact, it has been 
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previously demonstrated by authors as Guay et al (1996) as well as Dechow et al 
(1998) that estimates of discretionary accruals often include considerable 
amounts of non-discretionary accruals. Such limitation has been counteracted 
throughout this dissertation through the use of a large sample across six years, 
minimizing the influence of a low level of power regarding the reliability of the 
findings. More so, Models are not able to evidence causality, as managers are not 




Thru regressing the Dechow-Dichev Model, how each factor contributes to the 
prevalence of discretionary accruals within firms’ results becomes perceivable.  
Cash flow from operations deriving from the following and prior years affects 
positively all firms, presenting a more pronounced effect when considering debt 
as loans, while cash flow from operations from the current year provides for a 
negative effect across firms, increasingly evident when debt is taken into account 
as liabilities. Change in revenue appears to have a more pronounced role within 
mature firms rather than within startups, as does property, plant and equipment.  
Through estimating the Dechow-Dichev Model’s residuals, equivalent to 
discretionary accruals, results point to the prevalence of a negative relationship 
between startups and discretionary accruals and a null relationship between the 
latter and mature firms. This result places emphasis on startups and accruals-
based earnings management, appearing that mature firms’ total accruals are fully 
explained by the Model’s variables.  
Despite this, through analyzing the developed information quality measure’s 
average, regardless of how debt is taken into account, mature firms appear to 
present lower levels of information quality. Additionally, it is perceived that the 
year in which a firm is established relates negatively across startups and mature 
firms, although affecting startups supplementary. Adding up, loans affect all 
firms negatively, while liabilities seem to slightly affect all firms positively, as 
does the number of employees.  
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Regarding the question exposed within this dissertation’s introduction, it 
becomes possible to state that accruals-based earnings management does appear 
to differ whether startup firms or mature firms are considered, with higher levels 
of discretionary accruals prevailing within startups, although mature firms 
ultimately seem to provide for lower levels of information quality, being these 
findings congruent with the notion that mature firms rely on a much larger pool 
of resources and are able to manage their accounts more effectively if they choose 
to do so. 
Our hypothesis (refer to section 3.1) is, thus, rejected, since, although 
discretionary accruals do seem to prevail within startup firms over mature firms, 
information quality does not present itself weaker within startups, rather than 
within mature firms. However, although a firm’s year of establishment 
influences negatively both startup firms and mature firms, the effect prevails in 
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Appendix I: Figures 
 
Figure 1: ‘Conceptual framework of data quality’ 
 

































Appendix II: Tables 
 
Table 1: Observations’ exclusion process 
Observations (number of firms) 
Original Sample  2.439.909 
Absent Data  1.008.869 
Unavailable Data After Creating Variables  727.517 
Outliers (1st and 99th percentiles)  90.624 
Final Sample  612.899 
 
 
Table 2: Matrix for Version 1’s Pearson Correlation test 
Variables 𝑻𝑪𝑨𝟏 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝟏𝒏−𝟏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝟏𝒏 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝟏𝒏+𝟏 𝑪𝑹𝒆𝒗 𝑷𝑷𝑬 𝒂𝒈𝒆 
Total Current Accruals 1,00 
0,01** 0,06** -0,93** 0,08** 0,01** -0,03** 0,00** 




0,10 0,14 0,04 -0,01 0,46 0,05 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Cash Flow from 




-0,04 -0,82 0,00 0,03 0,00 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,19) 
Cash Flow from 
Operations from the 
previous year 
-0,93** 0,14 -0,04 
1,00 
-0,06 0,06 0,17 0,01 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Cash Flow from 
Operations from the 
previous year 
0,08** 0,04 -0,82 -0,06 
1,00 
0,01 0,01 0,00 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,82) 
Change in Revenue 
0,01** -0,01 0,00 0,06 0,01 
1,00 
0,01 -0,03 
(0,01) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Property, Plant and 
Equipment 
-0,03** 0,46 0,03 0,17 0,01 0,01 
1,00 
0,04 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 0,00 
Age 
0,00** 0,05 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,03 0,04 
1,00 









Table 3: Matrix for Version 2’s Pearson Correlation test 




-0,01** 0,05** -0,97** 0,07** 0,02** 0,00** 0,00** 




0,04 0,10 0,05 0,00 0,45 0,05 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,18) 
Cash Flow from 




-0,04 -0,62 0,00 0,00 0,00 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,42) (0,34) (0,40) 
Cash Flow from 
Operations from the 
previous year 
-0,97** 0,10 -0,04 
1,00 
-0,06 0,03 0,10 0,01 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Cash Flow from 
Operations from the 
previous year 
0,07** 0,05 -0,62 -0,06 
1,00 
0,01 0,02 0,00 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
(0,00) 
(0,01) (0,00) (0,89) 
Change in Revenue 
0,02** 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 
1,00 
0,01 -0,03 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,42) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,00) 
Property, Plant and 
Equipment 
0,00** 0,45 0,00 0,10 0,02 0,01 
1,00 
0,04 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,34) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Age 
0,00** 0,05 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,03 0,04 
1,00 












Table 4: Summary statistics 
 
Variables   Mean  
 Standard 
Deviation  





















(0,11) 267,54 (3.020,95) (919,78) (303,59) (39,94) 0,04 40,19 305,93 912,52 2.941,18 
Cash Flow from 
Operations 
32,71 285,38 (2.599,64) (825,78) (258,16) (27,51) 10,44 67,07 403,16 1.108,56 4.038,93 
 Change in Debt 0,37 144,53 (1.414,79) (514,79) (125,95) (0,01) 0,00 0,09 128,02 518,90 1.431,87 





















 Total Current 
Accruals 
(0,42) 417,14 (4.712,95) (1.459,98) (460,08) (55,61) 0,00 55,66 461,06 1.441,30 4.576,21 
Cash Flow from 
Operations 
33,03 428,57 (4.293,01) (1.349,62) (408,63) (40,85) 10,25 82,78 556,52 1.616,72 5.804,09 
 Change in Debt 0,05 212,55 (2.107,96) (757,72) (200,33) (8,18) 0,00 8,50 203,22 747,70 2.129,58 













Change in Revenue (8,33) 272,17 (2.415,81) (966,64) (306,69) (39,90) (3,91) 24,75 271,44 959,91 2.498,24 
Property, Plant 
and Equipment 
226,60 685,70 0,00 0,15 0,85 10,45 41,40 159,01 1.006,54 3.057,98 17.024,45 
Change in Current 
Assets 
1,13 305,86 (3.347,78) (1.040,66) (326,92) (38,16) 0,18 39,34 334,59 1.046,22 3.379,77 
Change in Current 
Liabilities 
1,42 295,09 (3.176,64) (1.000,03) (333,57) (38,04) 0,10 39,45 339,10 1.024,34 3.270,92 
Change in Cash 0.19   87,87 (713,95) (310,25) (102,71) (13,12) 0,00 13,29 103,30 313,00 718,97 
Depreciation 24,48 54,18 0,00 0,08 0,35 2,95 8,76 22,62 97,43 270,51 889,91 
Net Income 8,12 74.32   (571,60) (199,96) (58,58) (5,01) 2,89 13,85 89,98 284,72 1.055,30 
*Statistics were computed using 612.899 observations and are presented with two decimal places, with Variables being segregated into those common to both Versions of the Dechow-Dichev Model 
and those specific to each.
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Table 5: Estimated Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Accruals (compounding 
Total Current Accruals) 
Variables 
Version 1  
(𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 = 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔) 
Version 2  









Cash Flow from Operations 
from the previous year 
0,09 0,04 0,04 0,00 
(0,01) (0,02) (0,01) (0,00) 
Cash Flow from Operations 
from the current year 
-0,85 -0,87 -0,92 -0,95 
(0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,00) 
Cash Flow from Operations 
from the following year 
0,09 0,04 0,05 0,01 
(0,01) (0,02) (0,00) (0,00) 
Change in Revenue 
0,05 0,06 0,06 0,07 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Property, Plant and 
Equipment 
0,02 0,04 0,03 0,05 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Constant 
9,33 16,72 11,23 19,39 
(0,55) (0,98) (0,52) (0,27) 
 𝑅2 0,92 0,91 0,96 0,96 
Observations 24.820,00 588.079,00 24.820,00 588.079,00 
*Both Versions for the Dechow-Dichev Model were estimated with robust standard errors, ensuring homoskedestacity in all 
regressions. The number of observations is drastically reduced when the distinction between startup firms and mature firms is 
considered. 
Table 6: Estimated Discretionary Accruals 
Variable 
Version 1 (𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 = 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔) Version 2 (𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 = 𝑳𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒆𝒔) 
Startup Firms Mature Firms Startup Firms Mature Firms 
𝑫𝑨 (𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒔) 
-8,55 0,00 -9,74 0,00 
(0,35) (0,11) (0,38) (0,11) 
𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 24.820,00 588.079,00 24.820,00 588.079,00 
 
Table 7: Average standard deviation for residuals for Startups and Established Firms 
(Information Quality measure) 
Variable 











19,52 30,94 19,52 30,71 
(34,10) (49,09) (34,37) (48,58) 
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Table 8: Estimated Residuals’ Standard Deviation (Information Quality Measure) 
Variables 











-1,61 -0,12 -1,06 -0,11 
(0,82) (0,01) (0,84) (0,01) 
Employees 
0,09 0,07 0,11 0,15 
(0,08) (0,02) (0,08) (0,03) 
Cash 
0,06 0,04 0,07 0,04 
(0,02) (0,00) (0,02) (0,00) 
Loans 
-0,01 -0,01 -0,02 -0,01 
(0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,00) 
Current 
Liabilities 
0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Non-Current 
Liabilities 
0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 
(0,00) (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Constant 
3.242,98 250,82 2.139,05 246,59 
(1.648,08) (24,28) (1.695,22) (25,71) 
𝑅2 0,23 0,37 0,22 0,36 
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Appendix III: Graphics 
 
Graphic 1: Histogram for normal frequency for the ratio Total Current Accruals over 
Total Assets under Version 1 
 
*Source: Obtained through statistical software Stata, as estimated by the author. 
 
Graphic 2: Histogram for normal frequency for the ratio Total Current Accruals over 
Total Assets under Version 2 
 




Graphic 3: Normal Probability-Probability plot for the ratio Total Current Accruals 
over Total Assets under Version 1 
 
*Source: Obtained through statistical software Stata, as estimated by the author. 
 
Graphic 4: Normal Probability-Probability plot for the ratio Total Current Accruals 
over Total Assets under Version 2 
 






Graphic 5: Scatter plot for the ratio Total Current Accruals over Total Assets and 
Residuals under Version 1 
 
*Source: Obtained through statistical software Stata, as estimated by the author. 
 
Graphic 6: Scatter plot for the ratio Total Current Accruals over Total Assets and 
Residuals under Version 2 
 







Graphic 7: Average Discretionary Accruals per Year 
 
*Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Graphic 8: Spain and Portugal’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) evolution from 2007 
to 2012 
 
*Source: Google’s Public Data Explorer in September 2015, using International Monetary Fund’s data from April 2015. 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Version 1 11,76 0,90 2,11 0,83 -3,34 -7,07
Version 2 9,28 -0,19 -1,95 -1,77 -1,55 -0,25
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